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Abstract— To date publish of a giant social network jointly from 
different  parties  is  an  easier  collaborative  approach.  Agencies 
and researchers who collect such social network data often have a 
compelling  interest  in  allowing  others  to  analyze  the  data.  In 
many cases the data describes relationships that are private and 
sharing the data in full  can result  in unacceptable  disclosures. 
Thus, preserving privacy without revealing sensitive information 
in the social network is a serious concern. Recent developments 
for  preserving  privacy  using  anonymization  techniques  are 
focused  on  relational  data  only.  Preserving  privacy  in  social 
networks against neighborhood attacks is an initiation which uses 
the definition of privacy called k-anonymity. k-anonymous social 
network still  may leak privacy under the cases of homogeneity 
and background knowledge attacks. To overcome, we find a place 
to use a new practical and efficient definition of privacy called l-
diversity.  In  this  paper,  we  take  a  step  further  on  preserving 
privacy in collaborative social network data with algorithms and 
analyze the effect  on the utility of the data for social network 
analysis.
Keywords- bottom R-equal,  top  R-equal,  R-equal,  bottom R-
equivalent, top R-equivalent and R-equivalent, l-diversity
I. INTRODUCTION 
As  the  ability  to  collect  and  store  more  and  more 
information about every single action in life has grown, huge 
amounts  of  details  about  individuals  are  now  recorded  in 
database  systems.  Social  networks  have  always  existed  in 
society  in  varying  forms.  The  record  keeping  power  of 
computers  and  the  advancement  of  internet,  both  the 
interactions  within  and  scale  of  these  social  networks  are 
becoming  apparent.  Individual  social  networks  have  proved 
fruitful  and have been the topic of much research.  However 
with the development of agencies, facilitators and researchers, 
the  ability  and  desire  to  use  multiple  social  networks 
collaboratively has emerged. 
This has both positive and negative effects.  The positive 
effects focus on many possibilities for enriching people's lives 
through  new  and  improved  social  services  and  a  greater 
knowledge of people's  preferences and desires.  The negative 
effect focuses on the concerns that private aspects of personal 
lives  can  be  damaging  if  widely  publicized.  For  example, 
knowledge of a person’s locations, along with his preferences 
can  enable  a  variety  of  useful  location-based  services,  but 
public disclosure of his movements over time can have serious 
consequences for his privacy. 
However,  agencies and researchers who collect such data 
are  often  faced  with  a  choice  between  two  undesirable 
outcomes. They can publish personal  data for all  to analyze, 
this  analysis  may create  severe  privacy  threats,  or  they  can 
withhold data because of privacy concerns, this makes further 
analysis  impossible  and  may  hamper  the  social  feel  of  the 
network  and  may  lead  to  unpopularity  of  the  site.  Thus 
retaining individual  privacy is  really a  concern  to  the social 
network analysis society. 
A. Need of privacy in Social Network data
Let us ponder on two examples of social sharing that lead to 
troublesome situations.
Example  1:  The  Enron  corporation  bankruptcy  in  2001 
made available of 500,000 email messages public through the 
legal proceedings and analyzed by researchers [7]. This data set 
has  greatly  aided  research  on  email  correspondence, 
organizational structure, and social network analysis, but it also 
has  likely  resulted  in  substantial  privacy  violations  for 
individuals involved.
Example 2: Network logs are one of the most fundamental 
resources  to any computer  networking security  professionals 
and  widely  scrutinized  in  government  and  private  industry. 
Researchers  analyze  internet  topology,  internet  traffic  and 
routing  properties  using  network  traces  that  can  now  be 
collected at line speeds at the gateways of institutions and by 
ISPs. These traces represent a social network where the entities 
are internet hosts and the existence of communication between 
hosts  constitutes  a  relationship.  Network  traces  (even  with 
packet content removed) contain sensitive information because 
it is often possible to associate individuals with the hosts they 
use,  and because  traces  contain information about  web sites 
visited, and time stamps which indicate periods of activity. 
There  are  five  basic  types  of  IP  address  anonymization 
algorithms  in  use.  These  are:  black-marker  anonymization, 
random  permutations,  truncation,  pseudonymization  and 
prefix-preserving pseudonymization. Somehow these are trivial 
and  there  are  certain  mapping  methods  which  still  have  a 
chance to get exposed on attacks. To eliminate the hurdle of 
sharing logs, strong and efficient anonymization techniques are 
very much essential. [7].
Recent work has focused on managing the balance between 
privacy and utility in data publishing, but limited to relational 
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datasets. The definitions of k-anonymity [10] and its variants 
[2,  6]  are  promising.  These  techniques  are  commonly 
implemented  with  relational  micro-data.  While  useful  for 
census  databases  and  some  medical  information,  these 
techniques  cannot  address  the  fundamental  challenge  of 
managing social network datasets. 
Bin Zhou and Jian Pei [15] proposed a privacy preservation 
scheme  which  deals  against  neighborhood  attacks  of  social 
network  using  the  definition  of  privacy  called  k-anonymity. 
However, k-anonymous social network still may leak privacy 
under  the  cases  of  homogeneity  attacks  and  background 
knowledge attacks.
B. Contributions and Paper Outline
We  propose  an  algorithm  for  the  collaborative  social 
network anonymization which can be extended to the higher 
level  of  security  threat,  where  the  adversary  can  have  the 
information  even  about  the  vertices  which  are  not  the 
immediate neighbours of target vertex.
The  basic  definitions  are  provided  in  the  next  section. 
Section 3 describes the existing system to deal with the security 
in social network with k-anonymity as proposed by Zhou and 
Pei  [15].  We  extend  the  work  to  2-neighborhood  with  an 
algorithmic approach and highlight possibilities of attacks. To 
overcome from such attacks in social network, we use a new 
practical  and efficient  definition of  privacy called l-diversity 
[6]. It is proved [12] that l-diversity always guarantees stronger 
privacy preservation than k-anonymity. Section 4 highlights the 
proposed  system  of  collaborative  social  network 
anonymization  with  equivalence  relations  and  l-diversity 
method.  Our  goal  is  to  enable  the  useful  analysis  of  social 
network  data  while  protecting  the  privacy  of  individuals. 
Finally section 5 gives the conclusion
II.DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
In this section we reintroduce some basic notations that will 
be used in the remainder of the paper. 
Definition-1 (Modelling Social Network)  A social network 
can be modelled as a simple graph, G = (V, E, L, ξ) where, V is 
the set of vertices of the graph, E is the edge set, L is the label 
set and ξ is the labelling function from vertex set V to label set 
L, ξ=V-->L.
Definition-2 (k-Anonymity)  A  table  T  satisfies  k-
anonymity if for every tuple t∈ T there exists k-1 other tuples 
ti1, ti2, ..., ti k-1  ∈ T such that t[C] = ti1[C] = ti2[C] = ... = 
tik-1[C] for all C∈ QI
Theorem 1 (k-Anonymity): Let G be a social network and 
G' an anonymization of G. If G' is k-anonymous, then with the 
neighbourhood background knowledge, any vertex in G cannot 
be re-identified in G' with confidence larger than 1/k.
Definition-3 (Naive  Anonymization)  The  naive 
anonymization of a graph G = (V, E) is an isomorphic graph, 
Gna = (Vna, Ena), defined by a random bijection f: V-->Vna. 
The edges of Gna are Ena = {(f(x), f(x')) | (x, x')∈ E}
Definition-4 (Black-marker Anonymization) It replaces all 
IP addresses with a constant. It is quite similar to the affect as 
simply printing the log and blacking-out all IP addresses. This 
method is completely irreversible. 
Definition-5 (Random  permutation  Anonymization)  This 
method  creates  a  one-to-one  correspondence  between 
anonymized and unanonymized addresses that can be reversed 
by one who knows the permutation. 
Definition-6 (Truncation Anonymization) A fixed number 
of bits is decided upon (8, 16 or 24) and everything but those 
first bits are set to zero.
Definition-7 (Pseudonymization)  It  is  a  type  of 
anonymization that uses an injective mapping such as random 
permutations.
Figure 1. (a):A social network of interpol, G
Figure 1. (b): The Naïve Anonymization of G
Figure 1. (c): The Anonymization mapping
Definition-8 (Prefix-preserving  Anonymization)  In  this 
anonymization,  IP  addresses  are  mapped  to  pseudo-random 
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anonymized  IP  addresses  by  a  function  where 1 32n∀ ≤ ≤ , 
Pn(x) = Pn(y) if and only if Pn(τ (x))=Pn(τ (y)).
III.THE EXISTING SYSTEM
The naive anonymization of a social network is to publish a 
version  of  the  data  that  removes  identification  attributes.  In 
order to preserve node identity in the graph of relationships, 
synthetic  identifiers  are  used  to  replace  them.  Figure  1 
represents a social network of international police organization 
(Interpol),  their  naive  anonymization  and  the  anonymization 
mapping.
A. Publishing Social Network Data
 To  date  publish  of  a  giant  social  network  jointly  from 
different parties is an easier collaborative approach. Agencies 
and  researchers  who  collect  such  social  network  data  often 
have a compelling interest  in allowing others to analyze  the 
data.  In  many cases  the data describes  relationships that  are 
private and sharing the data in full can result in unacceptable 
disclosures.  Thus,  preserving  privacy  without  revealing 
sensitive information in the social network is a serious concern. 
Recent  developments  for  preserving  privacy  using 
anonymization techniques are focused on relational data only
B. Preserving privacy in Social Networks using k-anonymity
The algorithm suggested by Bin and Jian [15] to anonymize 
a  social  network  describes  two  basic  steps  as  summarized 
below.
Step-1 Neighborhood Extraction and Vertex Organization
The neighborhood of each vertex is extracted and different 
components are separated. As the requirement is to anonymize 
all graphs in the same group to a single graph, isomorphism 
tests are conducted. For this purpose, for every component of 
the  vertex  the  following  steps  are  performed.  Firstly  all 
possible DFS trees are constructed for the component. Next, its 
DFS codes are obtained with respect to every DFS tree. Further 
the  minimum  DFS  code  is  selected.  This  code  is  said  to 
represent  the  component.  Minimum  DFS  code  has  a  nice 
property [14]: two graphs G and G0 are isomorphic if and only 
if  DFS(G)  = DFS(G0).  Then neighborhood component  code 
order is used to obtain single code for 1 vertex.
Step-2 Anonymization
Anonymization  is  done  by  taking  the  vertices  from  the 
same group. If the match is not found, the cost factor is used to 
decide the pair of vertices to be constructed.
Algorithm for k-Anonymization of one neighborhood
Input: A  social  network  G=(V,  E),  the 
anonymization requirement parameter k, the cost function ,α β
and γ ;
Output: An anomyzed graph G';        
       1: initialize G’ = G;
 2: mark ( )iv V G∈ as “unanonymized”;
 3: sort  ( )iv V G∈  as VertexList  in neighbourhood size - 
descending order;
 4: WHILE (VertexList ≠ φ ) DO
 5: let SeedVertex = VertexList.head() and remove it from 
VertexList;
 6: FOR each iv ∈  VertexList DO
 7:       calculate  Cost(SeedVertex  iv )  using  the 
anonymization method for two vertices;
     END FOR
 8: IF (VertexList.size() ≥ 2k - 1) DO
             let CandidateSet contain the top k - 1 vertices with 
the smallest Cost;
 9: ELSE
       10:  let  CandidateSet  contain  the  remaining 
unanonymized vertices;
       11: suppose CandidateSet= {u1,...um} anonymize 
            Neighbour(SeedVertex) and  Neighbour(u1) 
       12: FOR j = 2 to m DO
       13:   anonymize  Neighbour(uj)  and 
{Neighbour(SeedVertex),  Neighbour(u1)  ....... 
Neighbour(uj-1)}mark them as “anonymized”;
       14:    update VertexList; 
            END FOR
            END WHILE
C. Algorithm for k-Anonymization of two neighbourhoods
Step-1: Let  u,  v∈ V(G),  u  and  v  have  similar 
neighbourhoods.  Then,  the  labels  are  generalized  or  left 
unchanged,  so  that  the  neighbourhoods  of  u  and  v  are 
isomorphic. Also, the labels of the vertices are same in both the 
neighbourhoods.
Step-2: If  the neighbourhoods are not similar, the cost is 
calculated and the pair of vertices with the minimum cost is 
considered.
Step-3: The  edges  necessary  are  added  to  make  them 
similar.
Step-4: The process  of  Step-1 is  applied on the vertices 
pair.
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D. Possible attacks on k- Anonymity
Figure 2. A social Network
Followings are two types of attacks that disclose sensitive 
information in k-anonymity [l-diversity] under two cases. First, 
if  an  attacker  can  discover  the values  of  sensitive attributes 
when  there  is  little  diversity  in  those  sensitive  attributes. 
Second,  k-anonymity  does  not  guarantee  privacy  against 
attackers  using background knowledge (Attackers  often have 
background knowledge).  
Since both of these attacks are plausible in real  life, it  is 
required to go forward with the new definition of privacy that 
takes care of diversity and background knowledge. 
Homogeneity Attack: k-Anonymity can create groups that 
leak  information  due  to  lack  of  diversity  in  the  sensitive 
attribute.
Background  knowledge  attack: k-Anonymity  does  not 
protect against attacks based on background knowledge.
IV.THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
In recent years,  motivated by quality-aware scenarios like 
imprecise observations, there has been a growth of interest in 
models  and algorithms  for  handling uncertain  data,  i.e.  data 
describing  many  alternatives.  Several  working  models  of 
uncertain data have been proposed, which precisely describe 
many possible worlds by outlining the alternatives  for possible 
events and the correlations or in dependencies between them. 
Given  data  presented  in  such  models,  there  has  been  much 
effort  in  studying  how  to  efficiently  evaluate  queries  and 
perform analysis over the uncertain data and come up with a 
compact description of the possible answers to the queries.
It  is  quite  clear  to  observe  that,  there  is  an  important 
connection  between  the  topics  of  Uncertain  Data  and  Data 
Anonymization. The process of data anonymization introduces 
uncertainty  into  data  that  was  initially  certain.  Data 
anonymization  provides  with  principles  methods  for  query 
evaluation and Uncertainty deals with a natural application area 
for  uncertain  data  and  both  with  a  rich  set  of  challenging 
problems. 
A. Anonymity with structural equivalence
Nodes  that  look  structurally  similar  may  be 
indistinguishable  to  an  adversary,  in  spite  of  external 
information. 
Definition-3: In a social network, a pair of nodes x and y 
are said to be structurally equivalent [3] ( x ≈ y ) when
1. V ( x, y ) = ∧  ( x , y )
2. for any v ∈ ∧ ( x , y ), R ( x, v ) = R( y , v )
3. if y∈ G ( x ), R( x, y ) = R( y , x )
The equivalence ( x ≈ y ) certainly means that x and y share 
a common set of relationships with a particular group of other 
nodes. It may not be necessary that x and y are to be directly 
connected/related.
Figure 3. Reduction Social Network
Figure 4. A Social Network Graph
Theorem 2: The equivalence relation induces a partition of 
N into disjoint equivalence classes satisfying:
1. x and y belong to the same equivalence class if and only 
if ( x ≈ y ) 
2.  for  y∈ G(  x  ),  R(x,y)  is  uniquely  determined  by  the 
equivalence classes of x and y.
The  key  issue  of  this  theorem  is  that  the  multitude  of 
relations  in  the  network  can  be  summarized  by  simply 
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observing the relations that  exist among equivalence classes. 
Figure  2 shows a  social  network with a  set  of  investigated 
social  problems  like  Ethical  Problems,  Threats,  Poverty, 
Political  imbalance,  Illiteracy,  Separatist  movement,  Crime, 
Terrorism.  Figure  3 shows  the  reduction  social  networking 
with structural equivalence [3].
B. Automorphic Equivalence
Definition-9 (Automorphic equivalence): It is one of strong 
form of structural similarity between nodes. Two nodes x, y∈
V  are  automorphically  equivalent  (≈A)  if  there  exists  an 
isomorphism from the graph onto itself that maps x to y.
Automorphic equivalence induces a partitioning on V into 
sets  whose  members  have  identical  structural  properties.  An 
adversary even with exhaustive knowledge of a target node's 
structural position, cannot isolate an individual beyond the set 
of  entities  to  which  it  is  automorphically  equivalent.  These 
nodes are structurally indistinguishable and observe that nodes 
in the graph achieve anonymity by being “hidden in the crowd 
” of its automorphic class members.
C. Vertex refinement
This technique originally developed to efficiently test for 
the  existence  of  graph  isomorphism.  Here,  the  weakest 
knowledge query, H0 simply returns the label of the node. The 
queries are successively more descriptive,  like H1(x) returns 
the  degree  of  x,  H2(x)  returns  the  list  of  each  neighbours' 
degree and so on. In general Hi(x) returns the multiple set of 
values  which are the result  of evaluating Hi-1 on the set  of 
nodes adjacent to x: Hi(x) = {Hi-1(z1), Hi-1(z2),..., Hi-1(Zm)} 
where z1,...zm are the nodes adjacent to x. Two nodes x, y in a 
graph are equivalent relative to Hi denoted x ≅ Hi, if and only 
if  Hi(x) = Hi(y).  Figure 4 is  a simple social  network graph, 
Table 1 represents the vertex refinement table and Table 2 is 
the equivalence class need to be further anonymized.
The proposed algorithm to anonymize a collaborated social 
network  with  l-diversity  describes  with  three  basic  steps  as 
summarized below.
Step-1  Formation  of  the  collaborative  social  network  by 
adding individual social networks
Step-2  Generating  equivalence  classes  of  nodes  of  the 
social  network  with  vertex  refinement  having  automorphic 
structural equivalence.
Step-3 Anonymization using l-diversity principle
D. The l-diversity Anonymization
Definition 10: (The l-diversity principle) A q*-block is l-
diverse if contains at least l “well-represented” values for the 
sensitive attribute S. A table is l-diverse if every q*-block is l-
diverse. 
Definition 11: (The l-diversity principle in social network) 
An equivalence class of social network node implied by vertex 
refinement  with  structural  equivalence  is  said  to  have  l-
diversity if there are at least l “well-represented” values for the 
sensitive node. It is said to have l-diversity if every equivalence 
class has l-diversity. 
E. Algorithm for Collaborative Social network with l-
diversity 
Input: A social network G = (V, E), l-diversity parameter
Output: An anonymized graph
1: S- The collaborative social network 
2: S(o, e)
    o – A node within the social network n
       oj –  The  set  of  social  networks  that  have 
provided  with  attributes,  the  numbering  is  made  at  the 
individual attribute level.
    e - A set of edges related to node o
ei – The set of social network from a user query
Sr – The resulting social network from a user query
3: N – A social network is being added to S
    N(d, g) - 
        d- A node within the social network 
N
        g- A set of edges related to node o
4: R- A revocation social network being removed from S,
    R(d, g)
          d- A node within the social network R
        g- A set of edges related to node o    
5: U- A user of S
    Uq – A query containing attributes to look for within S
    a(0)– An attribute or set of attributes of a node which can 
be used to uniquely identify the node
1: FOR each N(di, g) 
2: IF ( a(S(o)) = = a(N(d))) THEN
3:  FOR each attribute within d 
4:  IF the attribute matches in o
5:   oj = oj + N
5:   ELSE  
6: ADD new attribute from d to o with oj = N
7: END IF    
8: FOR any edge within e 
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9: IF it matches an edge within g
10: ei = ei + N
11: ELSE
12: ADD non-matching edges within set g 
            to set e with ei=N
END IF
      END FOR
13:  Add new node and edge set N(di, g) to S
       14:  anonymize N(di) and N(g)
       END IF    
       END FOR
V.CONCLUSIONS
In  this paper we tried to focus the important problem of 
preserving privacy in publishing collaborative social network 
data which is really an important concern. We have referred the 
k-anonymity  algorithm  for  social  network  using  one 
neighbourhood and extended to two neighbourhood approach. 
Further we have discussed the relevant attacks to k-anonymity. 
We have studied the extent to which structural properties of a 
node using equivalence can serve as a basis of re-identification 
in  anonymized  social  networks.  This  work  further  has 
potentiality to  extend using the rich rough set  theory.   A l-
diversity social network still may leak privacy. An adversary 
may have some prior belief about the sensitive attribute value 
of an individual before seeing the released table. After seeing 
the released table, the adversary may have a posterior belief. 
Information  gain  i,e.,  the  difference  between  the  posterior 
belief and the prior belief is the factor to leak privacy. Some 
mechanism analogous to t-closeness should be introduced.  
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